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ABSTRACT 
 
Emergent Leadership Structures in Organizations. (December 2008) 
Andrew J. Slaughter, B.A., University of Kentucky; 
M.S., Texas A&M University 
  Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Laura M. Koehly 
       Dr. Daniel A. Newman 
 
 
 A social network approach was used to investigate the structural features of 
various emergent leadership systems in a large financial organization (n = 137), 
including transactional and transformational-style leadership relations. Results indicate 
that macro-level patterns of leadership nominations may be explained by a small number 
of underlying structural features, some of which vary across types of leadership 
networks. Leadership nominations were shown to be less hierarchical, more reciprocal, 
and more triadic than traditionally thought. On top of effects associated with individual 
differences in sex, supervisor status, tenure, and physical location, leadership networks 
displayed tendencies towards reciprocity and loose core-periphery structures based on 
transitive hierarchies. There was also some evidence that transformational leadership 
networks tended to be slightly less centralized and more transitive than transactional 
leadership networks. Implications for bridging leadership theory across levels of analysis 
are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In order to better meet the challenges of a competitive marketplace and increase 
productivity, a common theme in organizations has been the increased use of self-
managed teams (Black & Lynch, 2004; Dumaine, 1990) and flexible, less hierarchical 
governance structures (Daft & Lewin, 1993; Evans & Wolf, 2005). Thus, instead of 
filling relatively stable roles within a clearly delineated organizational structure, 
employees are increasingly likely to be called on to take informal leadership roles, and to 
do so under increasing levels of uncertainty. This introduces a number of new 
perspectives for leadership research and practice. 
 Managers and employees must learn to deal with situations where group 
members come from different "social neighborhoods" with porous, ill-specified 
boundaries. In such groups, formal systems of hierarchical control may crisscross 
traditional organizational boundaries, and systems of vertical control may be inadequate 
or counterproductive. With increasing interest in less bureaucratic organizational forms 
such as network forms of governance (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997), managers may 
not be able to count on having clearly defined command and control structures, and even 
when such structures do exist, managers may find that the informal structure lying just 
beneath the surface of the organization exerts more substantial influence – and offers 
more potential leverage – than the formal structure (Cross & Parker, 2004). Thus, being 
able to describe and predict the likely form of informal systems of control and influence 
may be important for understanding and affecting individual and group behavior in  
 
This dissertation follows the style and format of the Journal of Applied Psychology. 
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organizations. 
 For researchers, this change presents several theoretical and analytical 
challenges. At a theoretical level, self-managed work groups and organic governance 
structures require updated theories of leadership and influence that can account for 
emergent relationships1, and the social structure defined by these relationships. At an 
analytical level, researchers should be able to identify, define, and properly account for 
the highly complex patterns of behaviors and cognitive interdependencies that the social 
structure may engender. 
 There have been a number of strides forward in addressing these issues in the 
context of leadership research. For example, some researchers have begun to move away 
from a vertical leader-centered perspective, and take into account horizontal 
relationships among followers (e.g., Ford, 2003; Sparrowe & Liden, 1997). Other 
authors have argued for a conceptualization of leadership as an emergent, distributed 
phenomenon that is a direct result of individual cognitions and social interaction patterns 
among group members (Meindl, 1993; 1995; Osbourn, Hunt & Jauch, 2002). 
 To better understand how informal leaders emerge in organizations and are 
perceived by others, researchers need to be able to describe the complexities of emergent 
leadership interactions. By identifying the structural characteristics of emergent 
leadership networks, a more complete picture of emergent leadership as a complex 
organization-wide system of control and influence can be developed. 
                                                 
1
 The term 'emergent relationships,' when used here, refers to informal social ties, not formally prescribed 
by the organization (Brass, 1984; Ibarra, 1993; and Krackhardt & Stern, 1988). 
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 This paper seeks to make several contributions. First, it will respecify emergent 
leadership as a process of interpersonal influence involving a network of dyadic 
interactions. Second, it will identify a number of orderly structural properties displayed 
by leadership and influence relations, such as reciprocity, balance, centralization, and 
generalized exchange. Finally, it will demonstrate how leadership type moderates these 
properties, leading to predictable differences in the structure of emergent 
transformational and transactional leadership networks. 
 These issues will be discussed in several sections. In the first section, past 
theoretical perspectives and empirical research on emergent leadership emergence will 
be reviewed. Next, important structural characteristics will be identified, defined, and 
linked to expected properties of emergent leadership networks. These expected 
properties will then be tested using recently developed statistical models for social 
networks. 
  
4 
EMERGENT LEADERSHIP 
 There have been many definitions of leadership, one of the most common of 
which is the ability to influence (Yukl, 1989; Yukl & Van Fleet, 1992). This influence 
may arise because of formal power vested in the leader, or because of more subtle and 
informal power to which they have access (Fernandez, 1991; Friedkin, 1993; Hollander 
& Offermann, 1990). A significant portion of leadership research has focused on leader 
effectiveness – specifically, the behaviors, characteristics, and contexts that lead to 
successful leadership and the effective exercise of the leader’s influence and control. 
Another major area of leadership research has focused on the study of leadership 
emergence. 
 Leadership emergence is defined as the process by which individuals come to be 
perceived as a leader by others in their group (Hogan, Curphy, & Hogan, 1994). It is 
related to the way that status is accorded by group members to one another (e.g., 
Campbell, Simpson, Stewart, & Manning, 2002), and how systems of informal control 
and influence emerge within groups and organizations (Sell, Lovaglia, Mannix, 
Samuelson, & Wilson, 2004). One result of this process is the existence of informal 
leaders, individuals who are able to influence others, but who do not necessarily have the 
most formal power in the group (Friedkin, 1993; Wheelan & Johnston, 1996); for 
example, managers may have a great deal of formal power and authority, but not 
necessarily the greatest amount of informal influence over other group members. 
According to this conceptualization, it is the ability to access or exercise this informal 
influence which defines a group member as an emergent leader. 
5 
  Emergent leadership represents a potential problem for organizations, because it 
is largely outside of formal control. Organizations spend a reported $15-50 billion each 
year on leadership training (Raelin, 2004; Rifkin, 1996) in an attempt to improve the 
ability of their managers and executives to guide the organization and influence 
subordinates. In this respect, the existence of informal leaders potentially undermines 
that investment, since such informal leaders may have their own goals and agendas not 
necessarily aligned with those of the organization. 
 Moreover, attempting to avoid the creation of emergent leaders and informal 
systems of influence may not be possible, or even desirable. Emergent, informal 
relations arise as the result of individual adaptation to challenges and issues in the 
environment, as well as needs that may not be fulfilled by the formal structure 
(Chisholm, 1992; Roethlisberg & Dickson, 1939). For example, workers on an assembly 
line team may be formally expected to report problems to managers, but issues with 
punishment or reprimands may lead them to seek information or resolution through 
alternative channels, such as knowledgeable co-workers. 
 In the case of leadership, emergent leaders may provide valuable support and 
guidance to employees when formal leadership is lacking or unavailable. Informal 
leadership may also enhance organizational flexibility and stability by providing 
alternative governance mechanisms capable of more rapid adaptation to changes in the 
local environment. In this sense, the system of informal influence provided by emergent 
leadership structures in organizations represents a potential resource – a kind of system-
6 
level capacity for leadership where multiple leaders may emerge, and any number of 
people may wield influence over others. 
Background  
 The traditional focus of emergent leadership research has been the identification 
of individuals in small groups most likely to be perceived as a leader, and the 
measurement of these individuals' characteristics. Within this context, there have been 
two general approaches to the kind of variables researchers have chosen to study: 
structural and psychological. 
 Structural antecedents. Research on communication, game theory, and social 
capital suggests that an individual’s position in the social structure has important 
implications for an individual's actual and perceived influence. Structural variables such 
as centrality are thought to affect influence and leadership perceptions by controlling 
how much knowledge individuals may have about the group, how many resources they 
are able to access, the speed of resource mobilization, and how much control they are 
likely to have over others' access to such resources. 
 Examining a workflow network, Brass (1984) found that ratings of perceived 
influence were correlated 0.39 with closeness centrality (how close an individual was 
with all network members, on average) in workgroups and 0.33 with betweenness 
centrality (how frequently, on average, an individual served as an intermediary between 
others in the network) in departments. Both closeness and betweenness in the department 
communication network were related to ratings of influence by others (r = 0.35 and 
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0.46). A study by Fombrun (1983) found that closeness centrality was a significant 
predictor of perceived power. 
 A meta-analysis of small group communication networks by Mullen, Johnson, 
and Salas (1991) found that the three types of centrality (degree2, betweenness, and 
closeness) correlated with leadership nominations 0.36, 0.38, and 0.38 respectively. 
Krackhardt (1990) showed that managers' betweenness centrality in advice and 
friendship social networks significantly increased the ability to predict individual ratings 
of influence (∆R2 = 0.17) above and beyond formal position in the organization. 
Similarly, Freeman, Roeder, and Mulholland (1980) found that all three types of 
centrality predicted leadership nominations. Brass and Burkhardt (1993) reported that 
degree centrality in the task-related communication network had a significant effect on 
perceptions of influence, although this effect varied depending on the type of influence 
tactics commonly used. Most recently, Bono and Anderson (2005) found that 
transformational leaders are more central in organizational advice and influence 
networks. 
 Psychological antecedents. Another major approach to studying leader 
emergence, prevalent in the field of psychology, is the study of individual behaviors and 
characteristics that result in influence and perceptions of leadership. This approach is 
supported by research on leadership categorization theory (Lord, Foti, & de Vader, 
1984). According to this theory, each individual has an implicit theory of leadership or 
                                                 
2
 Degree centrality is the number of connections a node has; that is, a node with 4 connections would have 
degree 4. Directional relations allow for the specification of two different types of degree centrality: in-
degree and out-degree centrality. These describe the number of connections received by an actor and sent 
by an actor, respectively. 
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schema which includes a number of traits and behaviors, and those individuals who most 
closely match the prototypical leader are more likely to be perceived as a leader (Hains, 
Hogg, & Duck, 1997; Offerman, Kennedy, & Wirtz, 1994; Weiss & Adler, 1981). To the 
extent there may be a number of commonly endorsed leader attributes (House & Aditya, 
1997), individuals with those attributes should be perceived as leaders more frequently 
than those without. Indirectly supporting this view, Kenny and Zaccaro (1983) found 
that between 50% and 80% of the variance in small groups’ ratings of perceived leaders 
could be explained by stable individual differences. 
 Much of this research has focused on individual skills and behaviors. For 
example, some research has shown that emergent leaders tend to engage in a wider 
variety of influence tactics (Howell & Higgins, 1990), including more assertive 
influence techniques (Madden, 2001). They also tend to engage in greater amounts of 
communication (Riggio, Riggio, Salinas, & Cole, 2003; Watson & Hoffman, 2004). 
Individuals perceived to have greater task competence or skill are more likely to emerge 
as leaders (De Souza & Klein, 1995), as are those who have greater intelligence (Lord, 
de Vader, & Alliger, 1986). 
 Other research has focused on individual differences such as intelligence, 
personality, and sex. This work has shown that individuals with greater intelligence are 
much more likely to be perceived as leaders (Lord et al., 1986). A number of narrow 
personality constructs have also been linked to leader emergence, including masculinity-
femininity, adjustment, dominance, and conservatism (Lord et al., 1986); self-
monitoring (Cronshaw & Ellis,1991; Zaccaro, Foti, & Kenny, 1991); need for 
9 
achievement and need for affiliation (Sorrentino, 1973; Sorrentino & Field, 1986). At a 
broader level, neuroticism, conscientiousness, extraversion, and openness to experience 
all predict leader emergence (Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt, 2002). Finally, research 
has found that sex and gender roles may play a factor in leadership perceptions, with 
men tending to be perceived as leaders more often than women (Eagly & Karau, 1991). 
A new approach to emergent leadership research 
 The issue of informal leadership emergence has been approached from a number 
of theoretical perspectives. This research has produced several important findings about 
the characteristics or social positions that increase the likelihood of being perceived by 
others to possess influence or be a leader. However, despite fairly strong findings related 
to individual characteristics and social position, a number of potentially significant 
limitations remain. 
 One limitation is that emergent leadership research has largely failed to 
incorporate theoretical advances from other areas of leadership research (De Souza & 
Klein, 1995; Kickul & Neuman, 2000). For example, theories such as Leader-Member 
Exchange (LMX) and transformational leadership have received a wide range of 
support, but have not usually been used to address research questions in the leadership 
emergence literature. This divergence is not without reason. Many theories of leader 
effectiveness do not have clear applications to informal leadership emergence 
phenomena (Mahar & Mahar, 2003). 
 One result of this lack of integration is that leadership emergence has tended to 
rely on extremely broad perceptual measures, such as whether or not an individual 
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"exemplifies strong leadership" (Taggar, Hackett, & Saha, 1999) or "is most like a 
leader" (Johnson & Bechler, 1998). Although such measures are valid, the over-reliance 
on what might be termed global ratings of leadership emergence make it even more 
difficult for emergent leadership research to take advantage of the many classifications 
derived from leadership effectiveness research, such as the distinction between 
transformational and transactional leaders. 
 The second – and arguably more critical limitation – is that leadership 
perceptions have been studied primarily in terms of an individual-level, leader-centered 
phenomenon (Gronn, 2002). Although leadership is frequently acknowledged to be a 
kind of interpersonal relationship (e.g., Brown, 2000; Popper, 2004), it is not usually 
measured as such. Instead, it is treated more as a generalized role that people with 
certain characteristics are more or less likely to fill. Even the growing number of studies 
involving structural position such as centrality (e.g., Bono & Anderson, 2005, Mullen et 
al., 1991) focus on leadership as an individual-level outcome. The end result of this 
narrow focus is an extremely good picture of emergent leaders, but not necessarily the 
most complete understanding of emergent leadership systems. Many human social ties 
display a variety of complex structural patterns that go beyond the individual level of 
analysis (Lazega & Pattison, 1997; Watts & Strogatz, 1998). Whether emergent 
leadership and influence relations display such complexities remains an open question. 
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EMERGENT LEADERSHIP STRUCTURES 
 Despite the focus on emergent leadership as an individual-level phenomenon 
(Gronn, 2002), there are substantial reasons to believe it is best conceived as a multi-
level relational construct. Failure to take this aspect of emergent leadership into account 
has a number of implications for theory and practice. By using social network analysis, it 
is possible to identify a number of different patterns in leadership networks that 
represent important relational tendencies governing the formation of leadership relations 
in organizations. 
 One of the primary reasons for treating leadership as an interpersonal relationship 
between an “emergent leader” and “emergent follower” is conceptual. By definition, it 
would be impossible for a person to emerge as a leader outside of a social group; it 
would make no sense to speak about an individual, stranded alone on a desert island, 
emerging as a leader. The very concept of leadership implies at least a dyadic 
relationship – a direct tie shared by two people, a leader and a follower. This sort of 
reasoning has been used by previous authors to suggest that leadership is not embedded 
in individuals or even in single roles, but represents a relational process, shared between 
group members, and embedded in the social context (Osbourn et al., 2002; Yukl, 1998; 
Yukl & Van Fleet, 1992). 
 To make matters more complicated, these dyadic relationships do not form in a 
social vacuum. Leaders influence others through both direct and indirect means 
(Osbourn et al., 2002), and one person’s choice of a leader may depend on the choices 
and behaviors of others in the network. Thus, relational choices may be interdependent, 
12 
as leadership relations form according to general social rules and cognitive mechanisms. 
These rules can result in specific types of structural patterns, which can provide 
important information about the level and type of interdependence in the network. 
 This type of relational data has the potential to be used for a wide variety of 
purposes. It can be used to test theories about the ways in which individuals and groups 
form, compete, and cooperate with one another. It can also be used to study the level of 
efficiency and redundancy in various social and technical systems, the tendency to form 
or avoid various types of coalitions, or the stability and resiliency of emergent, 
informally-specified relationships and particular structural forms. When combined with 
relevant actor-level data such as individual characteristics or outcomes, this information 
can be used to study ways in which knowledge and attitudes spread through groups, how 
particular aspects of social structure affect outcomes like performance, or how 
individuals select others with whom they interact. 
 Because these structural tendencies have important implications for the 
properties of the informal control and influence mechanisms that exist outside of the 
formal organizational structure, it is important to identify some of the basic structural 
properties of emergent leadership networks. Identifying these characteristics will help 
organizations better understand the ways in which informal control mechanisms could 
support or inhibit formal hierarchical decision-making; it could also provide a 
description of some of the basic structural patterns that future theories of leadership 
emergence should be able to explain. 
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Social network analysis 
 Handling relational data can be difficult because it can easily violate assumptions 
of independence in ways that are not addressed by more traditional techniques, such as 
hierarchical linear modeling (HLM). Social network analysis (SNA) provides a way to 
handle these data, allowing researchers to identify and control for complex dependencies 
which may exist at dyadic, triadic, or higher levels of analysis. Rather than focusing on 
the characteristics, attitudes, or behaviors of independent groups and individuals, 
network analysis focuses on interactions between individuals, and treats these 
interactions as important in their own right (Wasserman & Galaskiewicz, 1994). For 
example, interpersonal interactions can provide conduits for the flow of information or 
resources, or help to define the social environment which constrains and potentiates 
behavior (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). This relational analysis can be extended to 
include group and individual characteristics, and how these characteristics are embedded 
within the network of ties. 
 A social network consists of a set of actors (or nodes) and the relationships (or 
ties) between them (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Actors may be individuals, groups, or 
even entire organizations. Ties may represent any kind of relationship (e.g., 
communication, friendship, influence, conflict), and may be directional or non-
directional, and valued or binary. These ties may be studied at multiple levels of analysis 
(Monge & Contractor, 2003), providing different information about the relational 
tendencies that define the social structure and influence individual behavior and 
perceptions. 
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 The lowest level of analysis deals with individual actors and their place in the 
social structure. At this level, researchers may be interested in actors’ positions in the 
overall network, or what role they have. The numerous measures of centrality and 
prestige (e.g., closeness, betweenness, degree, etc.) are all individual-level measures, 
used to describe various aspects of an individual’s connections and relative importance 
in the network. The majority of research on leadership and social structure has focused 
on this level of analysis, using individual position (i.e., centrality) in friendship, advice, 
and communication networks to predict leadership outcomes. 
 At the dyadic level of analysis, researchers focus on the factors associated with 
relationships that form between pairs of individuals. This may include a wide variety of 
structural tendencies: the tendency for homophily, where individuals who are tied to each 
other tend to share similar attributes or characteristics; or the tendency to form reciprocal 
relationships, where actors respond to ties in kind. 
 The triadic level of analysis deals with structural tendencies involving three 
actors. At this level, researchers may be interested in the extent to which individuals 
form various types of clusters. Such triads can provide information on different aspects 
of hierarchy and local clustering, and can be used to test theories related to cognitive 
dissonance, social exchange, brokerage, or coalitional behavior (Degenne & Forse, 
1999; Monge & Contractor, 2003), among others. Higher levels of analysis can provide 
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information on how those clusters are spread across the network, or uncover the 
existence of larger patterns like core-periphery structures3. 
Random graph configurations 
 Many of the important relational tendencies at the dyadic and triadic level can be 
represented by a number of specific graph configurations. These graphs represent 
different kinds of local configurations which may be observed in a given social network. 
These configurations may be embedded in one another – for example, individuals are 
nested within dyads, dyads are nested within triads, and triads are nested within the 
larger networks. Although these lower-order patterns represent important structural 
tendencies in and of themselves (Lazega & Pattison, 1999; Van de Bunt, Van Duijn, & 
Snijders, 1999), equally important is their ability to describe how macro-level features 
such as density, centralization, core-periphery structures, or small-world networks4 arise 
from micro-level patterns (Laumann & Marsden, 1982; Robins, Pattison, & Woolcock, 
2005). Some of the common random graph configurations are described below, and 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
                                                 
3
 Core-periphery networks are defined by a small set of tightly connected central actors (the core) 
surrounded by a loosely connected set of peripheral actors (the periphery). 
4
 Small-world structures are the reason for the “six degrees of separation” phenomenon, the empirical 
finding that in many networks, any actor can be reached from any other actor in the network in an average 
of only six steps. Even in very large networks, small world properties (clusters joined by random 
connections) allow for connections between any two actors by going through a relatively small number of 
intermediaries. 
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Figure 1. Example random graph configurations. These configurations represent lower-
order structures which may be used to explain overall patterns of relationships in the 
global network. 
 
 
 Reciprocity (see Figure 1) is the tendency for two actors to form a dyad in which 
each selects the other as a network partner. Reciprocity is one of the most basic and 
important structural features of networks, with a number of implications for group and 
individual-level outcomes. Reciprocity in various networks has been shown to lead to 
increased trust (King-Casis et al., 2005); better mental and physical health (Jou & 
Fukada, 1996); more organizational commitment, perceived organizational support, and 
Dyadic configurations 
reciprocity 
Triadic configurations 
mixed 2-star out-2-star in-2-star 
transitivity generalized 
exchange 
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increased altruism (Uhl-Bien & Maslyn, 2003) and to ease the formation of subsequent 
exchange relations (King-Casis et al., 2005). In the case of leadership relations, this 
would be the tendency for two people to mutually regard one another as leaders. 
 In-star configurations represent the tendency for some actors to receive multiple 
connections from other nodes. In this context, it is similar to the concept of in-degree 
centralization, and represents variability in the centrality or in-degree of actors – the 
tendency for some people to be selected as a partner much more often than others. Out-
star configurations represent an analogous effect, related to out-degree centralization, 
where there is significant variation in the extent to which actors select multiple partners. 
 These effects are most often defined using 2-star configurations (shown in Figure 
1) - stars of degree 2, but accurate modeling of the degree distribution may require the 
inclusion of multiple higher-order star terms (for example, stars of degree 3 and 4). More 
recently, researchers have defined a single term (alternating k-stars) to capture the 
effects of multiple higher-order star configurations simultaneously. This term (Snijders, 
Pattison, Robins, & Handcock, 2006) models the degree distribution, and places 
appropriate weight on lower-order stars, which are more likely to occur in typical social 
networks. Positive k-star parameters indicate larger variance in the distribution of 
degrees, with several high-degree and many low-degree actors. Negative k-star 
parameters indicate a variable degree distribution, with few high-degree nodes. In terms 
of leadership, these k-star configurations would represent a tendency for high levels of 
variability in the extent to which some actors nominate (out-stars) or are nominated (in-
stars) as leaders by others. 
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 Mixed-2-stars are a configuration that describes the tendency for “bridge” 
relationships to form, or for two actors to connect only indirectly. This may result from a 
third party seeking an advantageous brokerage position over the other two, or from 
social pressures creating the need for a coordinator or liaison (Degenne & Forse, 1999). 
Forming and maintaining multiple sets of dyadic relations may require significant 
investments in the form of time and energy. Brokers who possess many ties may 
facilitate connections between otherwise unconnected actors (Gould & Fernandez, 1989; 
Marsden, 1982; Thurmaier & Wood, 2002), increasing the efficiency with which 
connections can be made between any two points in the network. 
 Just as there is a configuration designed to capture the effects of multiple higher-
order star configurations, there is also a term designed to capture higher-order 2-path 
configurations, alternating k-2-paths, in which an actor i connects to an actor j indirectly 
via some number (k) of intermediaries. This term is especially important because it 
captures the necessary preconditions for transitivity (described below) and aids in their 
interpretation. However, it can also represent an important structural feature in its own 
right. For example, in the case of leadership networks, a significant k-2-path term could 
represent the tendency for multiple third-party “influence brokers” to bridge pairs of 
individuals. 
 Transitivite triads are a particular type of triangle configuration which can be 
interpreted in terms of both affective balance (Wasserman & Faust, 1994) and linear 
hierarchy (Chase, 1980; Monge & Contractor, 2003) due to differential popularity or 
status (Feld & Elmore, 1982). In simple terms, transitivity represents the tendency for 
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“friends of my friends to also be my friends.” Snijders et al. (2006) discuss a higher-
order term designed to model transitivity, referred to as an alternating transitive k-
triangle. This term captures the tendency for transitive triangles that occur in larger-scale 
clusters, instead of randomly spread throughout the network. In terms of leadership, such 
structures may represent a tendency for leaders and influential actors to cluster together 
in certain ways. 
 Generalized exchange or cyclicity, as the name implies, is a generalized case of 
restricted exchange. Instead of being restricted to a dyad, the exchange may go through 
more than one person. In the simplest sense, it is the tendency described by the saying 
“what goes around, comes around.” A generalized exchange relationship in the case of 
leadership would imply that followers of roughly equal status may be recognized as 
leaders indirectly. 
Characteristics of emergent leadership networks 
 The specific configurations associated with emergent leadership have major 
implications for the way such networks form in organizations. For example, if emergent 
leadership networks have a strong norm of reciprocity, then actors who do not 
reciprocate – who never “accept” influence by others – would violate the norms of the 
group. These individuals may find themselves gradually isolated from the informal 
influence structure, as their influence attempts are rebuffed. Actors who encourage the 
influence attempts of others may find themselves with increasing opportunities for 
exercising leadership and influence within the organization. However, if the tendency 
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towards reciprocity was too strong, then each actor would influence everyone else, and 
there would be no clear leaders. 
 If leadership and influence networks are highly centralized due to indegree, then 
some actors will tend to have much more influence and receive many more leadership 
nominations than other actors. Such a network may be efficient, minimizing the number 
of competing or redundant lines of influence, but the loss of one or two key actors may 
“disconnect” all influence relations in the network. This type of network may therefore 
be fragile and easily disconnected. In many ways, this type of network would represent 
an organization with a very low capacity for leadership (Day, Gronn, & Salas, 2004). 
 Of all possible types of structural features emergent leadership networks could 
display, the concept of hierarchy has tended to dominate the way both theorists and 
laypeople conceive of the construct. Writers as early as the 1840's defined leadership in 
explicit terms of vertical hierarchies, and this conceptualization has persisted to become 
the "traditional" view of leadership (Brown, 2000; Chepko-Sade, Reitz, & Sade, 1989; 
Pearce & Conger, 2003), with some suggestion that hierarchical structures may be a 
natural response to pressures for efficiency (Kontopoulos, 1993; McBride, 2006) or 
competition within status and power structures (Chase, 1980; Kontopoulos, 1993). 
 In this view, leadership is a top-down process, often focused in a single 
individual who dominates the rest of the group (Mehra, Smith, Dixon, & Robertson, 
2006). If emergent leadership is truly defined by clear vertical hierarchies with strict (but 
perhaps unspoken) chains of command, then the traditional emergent leadership research 
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paradigm makes a good deal of sense. In such a structure, predicting who will climb to 
the top of the pyramid also lets you know who will be at the bottom. 
 The prototypical structure represented by this effect is known as a star network, 
shown in Figure 2. In larger groups, vertical hierarchies are often expected to take the 
form of tree-like structures, which involve large numbers of star-like structures chained 
together. In terms of local configurations, such a structure represents a strong tendency 
towards in-star configurations (i.e., high in-degree variance) and against reciprocity. In 
the case of leadership, such a network represents the emergence of a single influential 
leader. 
 
 
Figure 2. Star network. 
 
 However, a strict vertical hierarchy with one emergent leader and many 
followers seems relatively unrealistic for most groups. Research has shown that multiple 
leaders may sometimes emerge, even in small groups (Bales, 1958; Mehra et al., 2006; 
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Neubert, 1999). Moreover, research on power and status structures finds that even 
groups of simple animals can have complex pecking orders, exhibiting structural 
characteristics beyond simple centralization (Chase, 1980) or dyadic effects like 
reciprocity (Faust, 2007). Research on influence tactics and game theory suggests a 
number of possible “third party” effects, as individuals and groups compete and coalesce 
over time (Van Doorn, Hengeveld, & Weissing, 2003). 
 Which characteristics are likely to be important to emergent leadership 
networks? Assume that individuals vary in terms of status or influence-related 
characteristics and that status and influence are positively related. If high status is more 
desirable than low status (Jameson, 1945), and influence can be used as a substitute for 
(Westphal & Stern, 2006) or to increase status (Madden, 2000) in leadership positions, 
then theory suggests a number of specific structural configurations which are likely to 
define networks of emergent leadership and the patterns of informal influence which 
characterize them. 
 Centralization. Organizations are not composed of identical, homogenous actors. 
They are composed of people who vary across a wide range of individual characteristics. 
Actors may have different traits and skills, enter the organization at different points in 
time, have different jobs and roles, and have different places in the organizational 
hierarchy. 
 Individuals may differ in characteristics that are directly associated with 
leadership perceptions. They may possess more leadership-related traits (Lord et al., 
1986), or they may be closer to some idealized group prototype than other actors (Hains, 
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Hogg, & Duck, 1997; Hogg, 2001). Some actors are more talkative or more skilled, and 
leadership nominations and influence may be distributed accordingly, resulting in 
significant variation in leadership nominations across actors in the organization. 
 Individuals may also differ in characteristics that are indirectly related to 
leadership. According to status characteristics theory (SCT), individual differences may 
be associated with perceptions of status and performance expectations (Simpson & 
Walker, 2002). Differences in status characteristics lead to social stratification, the 
emergence of status and power hierarchies (Fisek, Berger, & Norman, 1991), and 
patterns of unequal influence (Ravlin & Thomas, 2005). High status actors are more 
likely to use a variety of influence tactics (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993; Han, 1996), have 
greater influence (Oldmeadow, Platow, Foddy, & Anderson, 2003), be considered 
experts (Bunderson, 2003), be provided initial opportunities for performance (Fisek et 
al., 1991; Shelly & Troyer, 2001), and receive more favorable outcomes in social 
exchanges (Cook, Emerson, Gilmore, & Yamagishi, 1983; Thye, Willer, & Markovsky, 
2006). This represents a potential “rich get richer” effect, where initial status differences 
translate into competitive advantage as actors struggle for status and influence, indirectly 
leading to significant variability in the number of leadership nominations received by 
members of the organization. To the extent that leadership networks are based on highly 
centralized networks surrounding a few key individuals: 
 Hypothesis 1:  Leadership networks should display significant positive  
   tendencies towards degree-based centralization, representing an  
   in-degree centralization effect. 
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 Transitivity. Another micro-level structure likely to occur in emergent leadership 
networks is transitivity. Past work on behavior in many different animal groups, 
including humans (Chase, 1980; Faust, 2007) as well as recent multiplayer game-
theoretic research suggests that emergent power and status hierarchies may be explained 
by an evolutionary, emergent process of repeated social exchanges or dyadic 
"tournaments" (Van Doorn et al., 2003) with third-party bystander effects (Skvoretz, 
Faust, & Fararo, 1997), resulting in transitive hierarchies5. Transitive structures 
represent an alternative to the fully-ordered vertical hierarchies represented by stars and 
trees; sometimes referred to as a “heterarchy” (Kontopoulos, 1993), a transitive structure 
can represent a partially-ordered hierarchy, in which not all relationships are fully nested 
within one another (as they would be within a tree-type structure). Structures such as this 
may arise when relationships are not required to be fully nested within each other, as in a 
tree structure: e.g., when actors in the hierarchy are allowed to form direct ties with 
others’ subordinates (including their subordinates’ subordinates), when subordinates at a 
given level are allowed to influence one another directly, or when subordinates perceive 
(and report) indirect influence and leadership from their supervisors’ supervisor. 
 According to simulation work by Van Doorn et al. (2003), if a status system were 
purely the result of independent contests or comparisons between individuals, such 
systems would display no tendencies towards transitivity, contrary to empirical 
observations (Sade & Dow, 1994). Moreover, they suggest that the existence of such 
transitive structuration cannot be explained by individual differences in resource 
                                                 
5
 In the simplest case, if A dominates B, and B dominates C, then A should also dominate C – a classic 
case of transitivity, representing an ordered hierarchy of social relations. 
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potential – that is, individual differences in skills, abilities, or other status characteristics 
may not be sufficient to explain the existence of stable, strongly transitive hierarchies. 
They argue that individual status hierarchies are based on competitive processes at two 
different levels: within-dyad competition that results in intra-dyadic power asymmetries, 
and between-dyad competition that results in inter-dyadic asymmetry, resulting in 
transitive hierarchies. 
 Such game-theoretic logic for transitivity in emergent leadership networks is 
bolstered by research on balance theory (de Nooy, 1999; Hummon & Doreian, 2003). 
According to balance theory (Heider, 1958; Cartwright & Harary, 1956), individuals are 
motivated to maintain cognitive consistency and avoid conflict by altering their 
cognitions about (or relationships with) other people. In the case of friendship, if A is 
friends with B, and B is friends with C, then it would be cognitively inconsistent for A to 
not consider C a friend. Balance theory is most clearly applied to affective relationships 
with clear positive and negative sides (e.g., like/dislike relations), but Heider (1958) and 
later theorists also noted that that balance theory includes so-called “unit” relationships 
(Arkin & Burger, 1980; Davis, 1963). Unit relationships represent a cognitive pairing 
between two units, where two things are perceived to belong together in some way. 
Typical examples include perceived similarity, physical proximity, kinship, or sharing a 
common fate (Arkin & Burger, 1980). In this sense, follower perceptions of individual 
leadership and influence can be seen to represent a “unit” relationship: a leader-follower 
pairing, as perceived by the follower. However, leadership ratings are also known to 
include affective components (Brown & Keeping, 2005). 
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 Thus, leadership may be defined by a given individual in affective terms, in 
purely relational terms, or in some combination of both. However, no matter which 
aspect of leadership dominates, we would expect that patterns of perceived leadership 
relations would be partially explained by balance theory. In the case of perceived 
leadership, balance theory would suggest that the leader of an influential person may be 
accorded some degree of influence indirectly. If A considers B to be influential, and B 
considers C to be influential, then A would be placed in conflict with B unless one of 
two things happened: A changes their attitude towards B (e.g., “Maybe B isn’t quite the 
leader I thought they were if they follow someone like C!”) or A changes their attitude 
towards C (“If B is willing to follow C, then maybe I should, too.”) In either case, it 
suggests the following hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 2: Leadership networks should display significant positive  
   tendencies towards transitivity. 
 Coalitions, reciprocity, and generalized exchange. While competition for status 
and influence can drive people apart through competition and lead to hierarchy, it can 
also bring people together through coalitional behavior. Coalition formation is a tactic by 
which sets of individuals may band together to increase their power and influence. 
Through coalitions, relatively low-status actors may maximize their own influence 
(Michener & Lyons, 1972) and reduce power inequalities (Simpson & Macy, 2001). 
Thus, coalitions are more likely to form in groups where power is distributed unequally 
(Mannix, 1993). 
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 The formation of small, stable sets of cooperative actors creates an interesting 
possibility: the existence of emergent leadership coalitions. A simple example of a 
network coalition can be seen in Figure 3. As shown in the figure, leadership coalitions 
represent tendencies for sets of actors to emerge as leaders and exercise joint influence 
within the network – for example, subordinates coming together to influence their 
manager. Thus, coalitions may be represented by a tendency to form leadership clusters 
from which multiple members exercise influence over the same followers. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Coalitional leadership structures with supporting processes. Grey nodes 
indicate leaders (coalition members), white nodes indicate followers. 
 
 
 
 This type of coalitional activity may be represented by the combination of 
several more basic network structures, including transitivity, out-stars, and 2-path 
effects. For example, Snijders et al. (2006) suggest that certain kinds of clustering may 
be represented by a positive level of transitivity combined with a negative k-2-path effect 
– such a structure will tend to produce several clusters of transitive triads with few 
indirect connections outside of those clusters. It will also tend to produce actors who 
send nominations to multiple interconnected leaders. In this sense, coalitional structures 
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will tend to be opposed to the basic in-degree centralization effect proposed in 
Hypothesis 1, and to the extent that such coalitional structures exist within the 
organization, then: 
 Hypothesis 3: Leadership networks should display a combination of a positive  
   tendency towards transitivity (H2) and a negative tendency  
   towards independent 2-paths (k-2-paths). 
 To support the formation of coalitions, actors should be able to expect the 
support of others (Lawler, 1975). Groups must also be able to avoid conflict and harm 
within the coalition and enhance solidarity and trust (Van Beest, Van Dijk, De Dreu, & 
Wilke, 2005; Michener & Zeller, 1972) – failure to do so leads to mistrust, lack of 
cohesion, and instability in the coalition. If coalitions exist in stable long-term relational 
networks, then there should also be evidence of social processes that support their 
existence. Research on coalitions has identified two important mechanisms which could 
play this role: reciprocity (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1994) and generalized exchange 
(Takahashi, 2000). 
 Hypothesis 4: Leadership networks should display significant positive levels of  
   reciprocity. 
 Hypothesis 5: Leadership networks should display significant positive levels of  
   generalized exchange. 
Leadership type as structural moderator 
 However, structural characteristics such as these (e.g., reciprocity, centralization, 
or others) may vary significantly depending on the specific type of leadership ascribed to 
29 
an emergent leader. Research on leadership perceptions has focused almost entirely on 
leadership as a broad, global characteristic. Other research provides evidence for several 
distinct types of leadership. One of the most popular models distinguishes between 
transformational and transactional leadership. 
 Originally developed by Burns (1978), transformational leadership is described 
as the ability to recognize and exploit followers' needs and motivations, and to satisfy 
their higher-order needs. Burns suggested that the counterparts to transformational 
leaders were transactional leaders – individuals whose relationship to followers was 
primarily one of leader-initiated tit-for-tat exchange – for example, in the case of 
politics, the exchange of political support for financial support. 
 Transformational leaders model idealized role behaviors, help organizational 
members to focus on others (such as the organization or the leader themselves), and 
empower their followers by stimulating learning, experimentation, and risk-taking 
(Torpman, 2004). Transactional leaders help others to understand the contingencies 
associated with behavior, execute those contingencies, and identify and correct 
significant deviations from expected behaviors (Torpman, 2004). Transactional 
leadership focuses on the maintenance of dyadic exchange relationships that cater to 
followers' self-interest (Bass, 1999). 
 Transformational leadership focuses primarily on perceived relationships and 
outcomes between potential leaders and others in the group. This is not limited 
(explicitly nor implicitly) to specific individuals who occupy a formal organizational 
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role. Rather, any actor who develops "transformational" relationships is, by definition, a 
transformational leader. 
 Transformational leadership is believed to be contagious; followers and others 
are thought to become more transformational through exposure to transformational 
leaders (Bass, Waldman, Avolio, & Bebb, 1987) in a dyadic process (Yukl, 1989). 
Transformational leaders tend to form relationships based on their own values, not with 
regard to social expectations (Kuhnert & Lewis, 1987), and use a number of influence 
mechanisms (Charbonneau, 2004; Torpman, 2004) not explicitly tied to hierarchical 
status like manager-subordinate relationships. 
 Because of these differences, we might expect transformational and transactional 
leadership networks to evolve differently in organizations over time. Take two 
equivalent networks (Figures 4a and 4d), one with a central transformational leader, and 
the other with a central transactional leader. Over time, the transformational leadership 
network may develop in surprising ways, as exposure to transformational leaders affects 
the formation of future transformational relationships (Figures 4b and 4c) while the 
transactional leadership network remains relatively static (Figures 4e and 4f). 
 Reciprocity and transitivity. One of the principal conceptual differences between 
transformational and transactional leadership networks is the extent to which they are 
likely to be transitive and asymmetric. In many ways, transformational and transactional  
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Figure 4. Hypothetical development of transformational and transactional leadership 
networks over time. 
 
 
 
leadership both represent a kind of exchange process. Transactional leaders provide 
rewards and punishments, transformational leaders provide guidance and motivation, but 
in both cases these resources lead to influence over others. The difference is found in the 
potential effect these exchanges have on followers. 
 Conceptually, the end result of transformational leadership relations are 
followers who feel empowered and motivated to act (Bass, 1999), and are more likely to 
become transformational leaders themselves. In this sense, being the follower of a 
transformational leader ought to accrue real benefits to the follower over time, one of 
a. 
d. 
b. 
e. 
c. 
f. 
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which is an increase in the followers’ own level of influence and the extent to which 
they are seen as a leader in their own right. At the dyadic level, this implies an increased 
tendency towards reciprocity (Figure 5a), as transformational leaders recognize similar 
leadership in their followers. At the triadic level (Figure 5b), this implies a tendency for 
transitive ties to form, as third parties recognize the informal leadership of both the 
original transformational leader and their “empowered” follower, and become a follower 
themselves, adding another layer of hierarchy. By contrast, the end results of 
transactional leadership exchanges are followers who are dependent or beholden to the 
leader. In such a situation, followers are no more likely than anyone else to be 
considered emergent leaders. 
 Hypothesis 6: Transformational leadership networks should display greater  
   levels of reciprocity than transactional leadership networks.  
 Hypothesis 7:  Transformational leadership networks should display greater  
   levels of transitivity than transactional leadership networks. 
 
 
Figure 5. Reciprocity and transitivity in transformational leadership relations. 
a. b. 
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METHOD 
Participants 
 One hundred forty-three (143) members of a small southern financial institution 
were surveyed. Of these, 137 individuals responded (a 96% response rate), of which 
65% were female, primarily white (95%). Many of the individuals in the sample were 
older (65% were over 356; 22% were between 24 and 35), and most individuals in the 
organization had been there for several years: 55% of the sample had a tenure greater 
than 5 years, although a sizeable number of individuals (18%) had been with the 
organization a year or less. The sample also included 55 supervisors and 13 officers in 
the organization. The organization consisted of 11 different geographic locations 
dispersed across a state. Location was coded using a categorical variable. 
Measures 
 Survey instruments distributed to members of the organization included seven 
sociometric items (six leadership questions representing three types of leadership 
relations, and one friendship question), as well as questions about sex, age, ethnicity, 
supervisory position, and tenure. Tenure was broken into three categories: less than 6 
months, less than 1 year, less than 3 years, less than 5 years, and more than 5 years. The 
three leadership networks in the study were measured using items adapted from Mayo, 
Meindl, and Pastor (2003). See Appendix C for details. Participants were explicitly told 
                                                 
6
 Tenure was measured using a 5-category response representing broad ranges of tenure (e.g., 0-2 years). 
Previous experience with similar network studies indicated that it took some people significant lengths of 
time to generate a number. Given the length of the survey, it was decided to provide broad categories to 
speed responding. Age was measured using a similarly categorized variable for the same reason. Because 
there was little variance in age as measured, it was not included as a covariate in the random graph models 
being tested. 
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to answer items without regard for individual’s level of formal authority, and given 
examples of such behavior.  
 Global leadership. The first network represented an overall (or “global”) rating 
of interpersonal leadership relations between each member in the organization. To create 
this network, two separate sociometric items were used to provide network measures of 
global leadership and influence ratings: 
 1) To what extent does person [X] influence your opinions, attitudes, or  
  behaviors? 
 2) To what extent does person [X] provide you with what you consider to be  
  leadership? 
 
 Transactional and transformational leadership. To construct network measures 
of leadership based on transformational and transactional-type relationships, sociometric 
items were constructed based on current definitions of each type of leadership. 
According to Bass and colleagues (Bass, 1999; Bass et al., 1987), transformational 
leaders “transform the self-concepts of their followers” (Bass, Avolio, Jung, & Berson, 
2003, p. 209) by acting as a role model. They also act as a coach and mentor, 
challenging subordinates to have higher expectations and set more difficult goals. These 
two major aspects of transformational leadership (role-modeling and goal-setting) were 
measured using the following two items: 
 3) To what extent does person [X] act as a role model to you in some way? 
 4) To what extent does person [X] help you set what you consider to be  
  more difficult or higher goals for yourself? 
 
By contrast, transactional leaders influence their followers by setting standards, 
monitoring performance, and offering rewards and punishment. Thus, two separate 
relationships – rewards and monitoring – were measured using the following items: 
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 5) To what extent does person [X] recognize or reward your performance? 
 6) To what extent does person [X] monitor your performance or notice how  
  you do your job? 
 
 Measurement. Each sociometric item was measured using a 3-point scale: not at 
all (0), somewhat (1), and extensively (2). Although the use of single-item measures may 
seem questionable on its face, such measures are common in network analysis, since 
typical sociometric items reflect relatively stable, easily identifiable relationships such as 
trust, friendship, advice, or communication. Past reviews suggest that such items possess 
adequate levels of reliability and validity (Zwijze-Koning & de Jong, 2005). For 
example, Ferligoj and Hlebec (1999) found that single-item measures of relationships 
such as social support and communication had reliability coefficients in the high .8's and 
validity coefficients in the high .9's. 
 Network construction. Although it is possible to analyze valued network data, the 
majority of social network methods (including random graph modeling, described 
below) are most easily applied to dichotomous ties. To facilitate analysis, the network 
data was therefore dichotomized. However, the ordinal nature of the original scale 
allowed for the creation of networks based on different thresholds for dichotomizing. 
Specifically, for each of the three primary networks being studied (overall, 
transformational, and transactional leadership), two networks were created. 
 One set of networks were formed based on only the strongest level of leadership 
relations reported. To construct these networks, each of the six component networks was 
dichotomized with matrix element xij = 1 if i reported an “extensive” relationship with j, 
and a 0 otherwise. Next, an aggregate matrix was formed based on the intersection of 
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these two component networks. For each of the three target networks (global leadership, 
transformational leadership, transactional leadership), elements of the matrix were 
defined such that a tie present in both of the component networks resulted in a tie present 
in the three combined networks. For example, if a person reported an extensive level of 
leadership and influence from another actor, then a tie between them was assigned in the 
global leadership network. If a person reported an extensive goal-setting relation with a 
given actor, but only a “somewhat” extensive role-modeling relation, then the combined 
transformational network would not contain a tie between the actors. The three 
combined networks based on this tie definition represent the strongest definition of 
leadership: all ties in the resulting networks are based on the existence of multiple 
“extensive” leadership relations. 
 Another set of networks was constructed on the basis of an alternative definition: 
instead of requiring that each component of the combined network contain an 
“extensive” tie, each component only had to contain at least a moderately-strong tie 
(e.g., “somewhat”). Using this definition, a dyad involving an extensive goal-setting 
relation but only a moderate role-modeling relation would still be assigned a tie in the 
aggregate transformational network. The networks based on this definition represent a 
slightly weaker and more relaxed definition of leadership. Thus, for each type of 
leadership, there was one network defined in two different ways – one representing 
“strong” leadership, and another representing “weak” leadership. A series of CFAs of 
the six leadership networks were conducted (Appendix B). Although they do not take 
into account the dependence introduced by the network structure, they do provide some 
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evidence that informal leadership ties may represent slightly different facets of a single 
general factor of influence. 
Analyses 
 Exponential random graph models (ERGMs) were used to test for the 
hypothesized structural tendencies. Given a set of actors, the observed social network 
represents just one possible realization out of a huge number of possible networks7. For 
an observed network X  with elements 



=
otherwise. 0
, with iprelationsh a has  if 1 ji
xij  
we know that certain structural characteristics are more or less likely to occur by chance 
– for example, in a network where most actors are connected, even randomly, we would 
expect to see a relatively large number of transitive triads or reciprocal relations, simply 
by chance. Exponential random graph models (ERGMs) provide a way to test whether 
certain structural characteristics are more or less likely to occur by chance, given the 
observed network (Wasserman & Robins, 2005). 
 An exponential random graph model can be written in the following form 
{ })(exp)(
1)( xzxXP iiθθκ ′==  
where P(X = x) is the probability of a the observed graph X, κ is a normalizing constant, 
and θ  is a vector of model parameters (similar to the β ’s of a standard regression 
equation) corresponding to )(xz , the vector of network statistics. These network 
                                                 
7
 In fact, a directed network with g actors has 2g(g-1) possible states defining the sample space (Wasserman 
& Faust, 1994). 
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statistics )(xz  correspond to counts of the various network configurations. For example, 
the network statistic corresponding to reciprocity is given by the sum of the observed 
number of reciprocal dyads in the network,∑
ji
jiij xx
,
. That number is then used to test 
whether reciprocity is a significant factor in the network. 
 Each model included a variety of structural parameters, as described in the 
hypotheses, as well as a number of parameters designed to control for the effects of 
individual differences on tie formation. This includes main effects associated with 
individual covariates such as geographic location and sex, as well as structural covariates 
associated with individual differences, such as homophily. Each model was fit by 
conditional MCMC-ML in SIENA (Snijders, Steglich, Schweinberger, & Huisman, 
2007), which estimates model parameters conditional on the network density. Thus, no 
baseline density parameter is included in the model. Significance of each parameter was 
assessed using t-ratios (parameter estimate divided by the SE of the estimate); t-ratios 
greater than 1.96 were considered to be significant. 
 In order to assess model fit, observed numbers of graph configurations associated 
with each parameter (e.g., numbers of reciprocal dyads, transitive triads, etc.) were 
compared to the simulated distribution of such values based on model parameter 
estimates. Poor model fit is represented by observed value being extreme compared to 
the simulated distribution, while good model fit is represented by observed values close 
to the center of the simulated distribution. The observed values for each parameter can 
be converted to t-values based on the simulated distribution of scores. Large t-values 
represent observations that are extreme relative to the simulated distribution and poor fit, 
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and small t-values represent observations that fall in the center of the simulated 
distribution. Each model was run until the t-value associated with all of the observed 
parameters fell to .10 or below. 
 Parameters can be interpreted in terms of the probability of the observed 
network, such that positive parameters indicate a network with that feature is more likely 
to be observed. These numbers can also be interpreted as log-odds. For example, a 
random graph model with a parameter value of .84 means that ties are 2.32 times more 
likely to be reciprocated than not reciprocated, since exp(.84) = 2.32. Each parameter is 
estimated conditional on the other parameters in the model, and must be interpreted 
conditional on other model effects; for example, a model with significant positive levels 
of both reciprocity and sex homophily would indicate that there is a significant tendency 
for people to reciprocate ties, taking into account the effects of tie formation based on 
dyadic similarities in sex. 
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RESULTS 
 Table 1 provides an overview of several key structural characteristics for each of 
the four target networks, broken down by the method used to define the dichotomous 
adjacency matrix (e.g., whether a “weak” or “strong” definition of ties were used). 
Statistics for the organization’s friendship network are provided for the sake of 
comparison with the leadership network. The descriptive statistics show that the 
networks are very sparse, with most densities well below .10, and that the leadership 
networks tend to be significantly sparser than the equivalently defined friendship 
network (p < .01). 
 The table also suggests that the networks are not extremely centralized8, 
indicating that there does not tend to be a great amount of variability in the extent to 
which members of the organization send or receive ties, compared to the maximum 
possible variability that might be observed in a graph of this size. The statistics indicate 
that the leadership networks are roughly equivalent in terms of centralization, with most 
centralization indices falling between 0.20 and 0.35; however, the centralization of 
incoming “strong” transactional leadership ties were particularly low (centralization = 
0.17), indicating that most people tended to be monitored and rewarded “extensively” by 
roughly similar numbers of other actors. Also of note, friendship outdegrees appeared to 
be moderately centralized (0.45 and 0.38). This indicates a substantial degree of 
dispersion in the rates at which actors nominated others as friends.
                                                 
8
 Centralization indices range from 0 to 1, and can be used to represent the degree of dispersion or 
inequality of the individual centralities (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). That is, the higher the centralization 
index, the more the network is dominated by a few well-connected actors; the lower the centralization 
score, the more the network will tend to have actors with relatively similar numbers of connections. 
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Table 1 
Network descriptive statistics 
     
                  Indegree          Outdegree 
Network         Hierarchy       Efficiency   Connectedness   Centralization   Centralization    Density 
Weak definition 
 Leadership  0.12  0.93  0.96  0.32  0.29  0.07** 
 Transformational 0.10  0.94  0.93  0.32  0.30  0.06** 
 Transactional  0.08  0.96  0.92  0.33  0.35  0.05** 
 Friendship  0.17  0.84  1.00  0.24  0.45  0.16 
 
Strong definition 
 Leadership  0.05  0.98  0.81  0.24  0.30  0.02** 
 Transformational 0.04  0.98  0.79  0.21  0.29  0.02** 
 Transactional  0.04  0.98  0.67  0.17  0.27  0.02** 
 Friendship  0.08  0.95  0.99  0.09  0.38  0.05 
 
 
** Compared to density of equivalently defined friendship network, p < .01. 
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 The other descriptive statistics provided in Table 1 were proposed by Krackhardt 
(1994) as indicators of a network’s level of hierarchical structure. Connectedness 
represents the proportion of actors that can be reached by others in the network – fully 
connected networks will have a score of 1, and unconnected networks (ones with no ties) 
will have a score of 0. The scores indicate that the networks were relatively well-
connected. In this organization, the least well-connected network was transactional 
leadership (connectedness = 0.67 for strongly-defined ties). These numbers indicate that 
most people were connected in some way to the leadership structure of the organization. 
 The other graph statistics – hierarchy and efficiency – represent 1) the proportion 
of non-null dyads that are asymmetrical, and 2) the extent to which graph components 
are minimally connected9. Numbers may range from 0 to 1. The statistics indicate that 
the organizational networks apparently tend towards more reciprocal relations, and that 
the network tends to be relatively efficient. 
 To further visualize the shape of the network, Figure 6 provides a series of plots 
showing the distribution of actor in-degrees (leadership nominations received) and out-
degrees (leadership nominations made) across each of the three types of leadership 
networks10. Each plot shows the distribution of degree scores for a given network based 
on a “strong” and a “relaxed” (or weak) definition of adjacency. Strong networks 
appeared to have fewer high-degree actors and more very low-degree actors, but roughly 
similar distributional forms. Figure 7 provides a slightly different view of the data, 
                                                 
9
 Efficiency provides information about redundancies in the network – if actors tend to be connected by 
several different paths simultaneously, efficiency scores will be low. 
10
 These represent unnormalized degree centralities. 
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Figure 6. Degree distributions (in- and out-degree) for leadership networks. 
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Figure 7. Comparative leadership network degree distributions. 
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Table 2 
Component network QAP correlations11 
 
   1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 
Weak 
1.    Leadership   
2.    Influence .77  
3.    Role  .81 .77 
4.    Goal  .78 .73 .78 
5.    Reward .69 .66 .69 .71 
6.    Monitor .68 .65 .63 .68 .70 
7.    Friendship .55 .63 .58 .53 .51 .48 
 
Strong 
8. Leadership .60 .51 .57 .59 .55 .54 .36 
9. Influence .53 .56 .54 .55 .53 .52 .39 .74 
10 Role  .56 .50 .59 .59 .54 .50 .36 .78 .72 
11. Goal  .54 .48 .53 .61 .54 .52 .33 .74 .67 .76 
12. Reward .49 .45 .49 .54 .61 .52 .33 .68 .62 .68 .70 
13. Monitor .53 .47 .48 .53 .57 .64 .34 .65 .62 .60 .66 .70 
14. Friendship .41 .46 .45 .43 .42 .33 .55 .42 .47 .44 .40 .43 .37 
 
                                                 
11
 All correlations are significant at p < .01. 
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Table 3 
Aggregate network QAP correlations12 
 
    1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
Weak 
1.    Global leadership   
2. Transformational 0.81 
3. Transactional  0.66 0.69 
4. Friendship  0.54 0.50 0.44 
 
Strong 
5. Global leadership 0.62 0.62 0.59 0.36 
6. Transformational 0.52 0.59 0.54 0.30 0.75 
7. Transactional  0.47 0.51 0.62 0.29 0.66 0.71 
8. Friendship  0.42 0.44 0.35 0.55 0.42 0.40 0.39 
 
                                                 
12
 All correlations are significant at p < .01. 
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comparing the shape of degree distributions for each of the three networks more directly. 
As shown in Figure 7, each of the three leadership networks had very similar degree 
distributions, with somewhat higher degrees for global leadership than transactional 
leadership in weak leadership networks. 
 Another important aspect of the organizational networks is the degree to which 
they overlap. Table 2 presents QAP correlations between each of the seven original 
component networks used to form the aggregate networks used in other analyses. There 
were significant and substantial correlations between each of the networks, with some of 
the highest correlations between the role-setting, goal-setting, and leadership networks. 
There also appeared to be slightly lower correlations between networks formed using 
“strong” criteria. Table 3 presents QAP correlations for the aggregate networks. Again, 
there were fairly substantial correlations between global leadership ties and 
transformational leadership ties. Friendship ties also correlated significantly with each of 
the three types of leadership relations, although leadership relations tended to correlate 
more strongly with one another than with friendship. 
 To get a better picture of the network, Figures 8-15 provide pictures of each of 
the four organizational networks using both strong and weak tie definitions. The size of 
the network can make it difficult to see specific features clearly, so Figure 16 provides a 
vector-based graphic that demonstrates the general pattern of ties that may be observed 
within each network. Specifically, Figure 16 shows what appear to be two large 
components, each with their own associated cores, peripheries, and local clusters. 
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Leadership (relaxed)
 
 
Figure 8. Leadership network, based on weak definition of adjacency. 
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Leadership (strong)
 
Figure 9. Leadership network, based on strong definition of adjacency. 
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Transformational leadership (relaxed)
 
Figure 10. Transformational leadership network, based on weak definition of adjacency. 
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Transformational leadership (strong)
 
Figure 11. Transformational leadership network, based on strong definition of adjacency. 
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Transactional leadership (relaxed)
 
Figure 12. Transactional leadership network based on weak definition of adjacency. 
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Transactional leadership (strong)
 
Figure 13. Transactional leadership network based on strong definition of adjacency. 
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Friendship (relaxed)
 
Figure 14. Friendship network based on weak definition of adjacency. 
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Friendship (strong)
 
Figure 15. Friendship network based on strong definition of adjacency. 
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Pajek
 
Figure 16. Example network layout showing leadership relations based on a strong definition of adjacency. 
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Figure 17. Example graphs with k-star parameters (from left to right) of -0.8, 0, and 0.8 showing the shift from a segmented to 
a centralized structure. 
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Global leadership network 
 General interpretations of the model parameters being tested are shown in Table 
4a. Table 4b shows the estimated model parameters for each of the six aggregate 
leadership networks used in the analyses, represented by Models I-VI, and Table 4c 
provides the odds ratios associated with each parameter. Table 5 provides an overview 
of the tendency (positive, negative, or null) for different types of structures. Hypotheses 
1-5 refer to structures in the global leadership structure (i.e., not specific to a particular 
type of leadership), and are tested in Models I and II. Model I describes the structure of 
the global leadership network based on a weaker definition of leadership and influence, 
while Model II is based on a stronger definition. 
 The first hypothesis (H1) was that a global (or overall) emergent leadership 
network should display tendencies for some actors to receive multiple ties – specifically, 
that some actors should be much more prominent in the leadership and influence 
network than others. This hypothesis is tested by the “in-k-star” parameter, shown in 
Table 4b. A positive k-star parameter represents a tendency for high levels of variance in 
the degrees (number of ties) associated with actors in the network, core-periphery 
structures based on degrees, and preferential attachment13; a negative in-star parameter 
suggests that degree distributions in the observed graph are less dispersed, with most 
actors tending to have smaller, more moderate numbers of connections, and relatively 
few actors having very high large numbers of connections. Figure 17 provides some 
                                                 
13
 Preferential attachment refers to the tendency for low-degree actors to form attachments to higher-
degree actors, which is sometimes described as a “rich gets richer” effect. 
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Table 4a 
Interpretation of ERGM parameters 
 
Structural characteristics  Interpretation 
 Reciprocal dyads  Reciprocity 
 Alternating out-k-stars Variance in out-stars, with greater weight attached to lower-order stars. Out-degree  
     centralization. Models the out-degree distribution. 
 Alternating in-k-stars  Variance in in-stars, with greater weight attached to lower-order stars. In-degree  
     centralization. Models the in-degree distribution. 
 Alternating 2-paths  Higher-order term representing indirect connections. Tendency for a set of actors to  
     share multiple short indirect connections through third parties. 
 Alternating k-triangles Higher-order transitivity term. Tendency for transitive triads to form, especially in  
     groups. 
 3-cycles   Generalized exchange 
 
Homophily effects 
 Location   Likelihood of sharing a tie if two actors share a physical location. 
 Sex      Likelihood of sharing a tie if two actors have the same sex. 
 Supervisor status  Likelihood of sharing a tie if two actors are both supervisors. 
 Tenure    Likelihood of sharing a tie if two actors have more similar tenure in the organization. 
 
Attribute ego effects 
 Sex    Main effect of sex on the number of leader nominations made. 
 Supervisor status  Main effect of supervisor status on the number of leader nominations made. 
 Tenure    Main effect of tenure on the number of leader nominations made. 
 
Attribute alter effects 
 Sex    Main effect of sex on the number of leader nominations received. 
 Supervisor status  Main effect of supervisor status on the number of leader nominations received. 
 Tenure    Main effect of tenure on the number of leader nominations received.
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Table 4b 
Exponential random graph models of emergent organizational leadership networks 
 
      Global (overall) leadership          Transformational           Transactional  
    Weak (I) Strong (II)  Weak (III) Strong (IV) Weak (V) Strong (VI) 
 
Structural characteristics 
 Reciprocal dyads    .84 (.17)**   .32 (.64)    .91 (.21)** -1.87(1.29) 1.34 (.22)**   .07 (.78) 
 Alternating out-k-stars   .34 (.10)**   .86 (.11)**    .62 (.10)**  1.05 (.11)**   .80 (.10)**  1.02 (.11)** 
 Alternating in-k-stars - .76 (.15)**   .17 (.13)  - .63 (.15)**   .19 (.13) - .03 (.12)   .47 (.12)** 
 Alternating 2-paths - .15 (.01)** - .29 (.03)**  - .18 (.01)** - .30 (.03)** - .17 (.01)** - .23 (.03)** 
 Alternating k-triangles 1.25 (.05)**  1.09 (.06)**  1.19 (.04)**  1.13 (.07)** 1.03 (.05)**  1.03 (.08)** 
 3-cycles   - .26 (.04)** -1.64 (.74)**  - .40 (.07)** -1.11 (1.05) - .34 (.07)** -1.76 (1.05) 
 
Homophily effects 
 Location    .31 (.03)**   .74 (.09)**    .32 (.04)**   .76 (.10)**   .36 (.05)**   .72 (.10)** 
 Sex14     .23 (.04)**   .12 (.09)    .26 (.05)**   .17 (.10)   .22 (.07)**   .11 (.11) 
 Supervisor status15 - .01 (.05)   .02 (.11)    .00 (.07) - .06 (.11) - .19 (.08)** - .12 (.12) 
 Tenure     .24 (.10)**   .20 (.23)    .12 (.13)   .14 (.25)   .35 (.15)**   .35 (.27) 
 
Attribute ego effects 
 Sex   - .13 (.02)** - .31 (.06)**  - .14 (.03)** - .24 (.06)** - .13 (.04)** - .21 (.06)** 
 Supervisor status  - .05 (.03)   .01 (.07)  - .05 (.03)   .06 (.07)   .01 (.04)   .08 (.07) 
 Tenure   - .04 (.02)** - .03 (.04)  - .01 (.02) - .02 (.04) - .05 (.03) - .06 (.05) 
 
Attribute alter effects 
 Sex   - .14 (.02)** - .32 (.06)**  - .16 (.03)** - .31 (.07)** - .16 (.03)** - .24 (.07)** 
 Supervisor status    .06 (.02)**   .19 (.07)**    .06 (.03)   .23 (.08)**   .08 (.04)*   .25 (.08)** 
 Tenure     .04 (.02)*   .11 (.04)**    .06 (.02)**   .12 (.05)**   .04 (.02)   .09 (.05)* 
                                                 
14
 Sex was coded M=0, F=1. 
15
 Supervisor status was coded No=0, Yes=1. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01). Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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Table 4c 
Odds ratios associated with each parameter 
 
      Global (overall) leadership        Transformational           Transactional  
    Weak (I) Strong (II)  Weak (III) Strong (IV) Weak (V) Strong (VI) 
 
Structural characteristics 
 Reciprocal dyads  2.13**  1.38   2.48**  .153  .82**  1.07 
 Alternating out-k-stars 1.40**    2.36**   1.86**    2.86**  2.22**  2.77** 
 Alternating in-k-stars .47**  1.19   .53**  1.21  .97      1.60** 
 Alternating 2-paths .86**   .75**   .83**  .74**  .84**    .79** 
 Alternating k-triangles 3.49**  2.97**   3.29**  3.10**  2.80**  2.80** 
 3-cycles   .77**    .19**   .67**   .33  .71**  .17 
 
Homophily effects 
 Location  1.36**  2.10**   1.38**    2.14**  1.43**  2.05** 
 Sex16   1.26**  1.13   1.30**    1.18  1.24**  1.11 
 Supervisor status17   .99     .98   1  .94  .83**  .89 
 Tenure   1.27**    1.22   1.13    1.15  1.42**  1.42 
 
Attribute ego effects 
 Sex   .88**   .73**   .87**  .79**  .88**  .81** 
 Supervisor status  .95   .99   .95  1.06  .99  1.08 
 Tenure   .96**   .97   .99  .98  .95  .94 
 
Attribute alter effects 
 Sex     .87**   .73**   .85**  .73**  .85**  .79** 
 Supervisor status  1.06**    1.21**   1.06  1.26**  1.08*  1.28** 
 Tenure   1.04*  1.12**   1.06**  1.13**  1.04   1.09* 
                                                 
16
 Sex was coded M=0, F=1. 
17
 Supervisor status was coded No=0, Yes=1. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01). Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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Table 5 
Overview of evidence for various structural configurations18 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Positive tendencies for structural configurations are represented with a ‘+’, negative tendencies with a ‘-‘. Structural parameters not significantly 
different from zero are marked with a 0. 
Global (overall) leadership  Transformational leadership  Transactional leadership 
Strong           Weak  Strong           Weak  Strong           Weak 
   0   +  0   +  0   + 
 
   0   -  0   -  +   0 
 
 
   +   +  +   +  +   + 
 
 
   -   -  -   -  -   - 
 
 
   +   +  +   +  +   + 
 
 
   -   -  0   -  0   - 
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example graphs for different k-star parameters, showing how graphs with various 
positive and negative k-star coefficients tend to appear. 
 As shown in Model I, the in-star parameter is slightly negative. This indicates 
that most actors are not likely to receive an especially large number of global leadership 
nominations, and that there is slightly less variance in each actor’s nominations as a 
leader than we would expect to see by chance, taking into account other effects in the 
model, such as transitivity. In the strong network of global leadership nominations 
(Model II), this effect is positive, but not significantly different from zero; this implies 
there is no significant tendency for high or low variance in the leadership nominations 
received by actors conditional on other effects in the model. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was not 
generally supported; in fact, for weak leadership networks, the results indicate a slight 
preference for attachment to actors with fewer leadership nominations, conditional on 
other model effects; and no significant tendency for preferential attachment or in-degree-
based core-periphery structures for strong leadership relations. 
 The second major type of structural feature expected to define networks of global 
(or overall) emergent leadership was transitivity (H2). As shown in Table 4b (Models I 
and II), there were strong tendencies for actors to engage in overlapping transitive 
leadership structures. These transitive k-triangles may occur because of both real 
pressures for transitive triangles (e.g., competition resulting in partially ordered 
hierarchies), as well as by chance (e.g., a combination of homophily, degree 
distributions, k-paths, and random ties); however, the inclusion of these parameters in 
the model controls for these alternative explanations, indicating that the high levels of 
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transitive triangles observed in the model are due to actual transitivity effects, not a 
combination of other factors. 
 These transitive triangles tend to occur in overlapping clusters, which suggests 
that core-periphery structures in the network tend to be based on transitivity, not degrees. 
Moreover, the strong positive transitivity effect, combined with the weak in-star effect 
suggests that high-degree actors tend to have high degrees because of their participation 
in complex transitive clusters, not because they are the center of many independent 
leadership nominations (e.g., in-star parameters). Because there is a negative 2-path 
effect, the positive k-triangle effect suggests some pressure for clique-like structures in 
the organization (Snijders et al., 2006), where individuals who receive many leadership 
nominations are more likely to do so within dense clusters. Overall, Hypothesis 2 was 
strongly supported. 
 The third hypothesis (H3) suggested that leadership networks should display 
significant levels of clustering, representing the tendency for coalition formation, based 
on transitive k-triangles and negative independent k-paths. The parameter tests indicate 
that Hypothesis 3 was strongly supported for both relaxed and strong definitions of 
leadership (Model I and II). 
 According to the fourth hypothesis (H4), overall emergent leadership 
nominations should display significant tendencies towards reciprocity. For moderately 
strong leadership networks, the random graph analyses indicate a strong positive 
tendency for individuals to reciprocate leadership nominations (see Model I in Table 
4b): in other words, compared to a random network with similar levels of homophily, 
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clustering, density, and other effects, there is a greater tendency to reciprocate leadership 
nominations19. 
 However, this tendency towards reciprocity is no longer significant for leadership 
nominations based on a higher threshold (Model II). This implies that for strong 
emergent leadership relations, there are no more and no fewer reciprocal dyads than 
would be expected by chance, conditional on the other model parameters. Thus, 
Hypothesis 4 was supported for weak leadership networks, but rejected for leadership 
networks based on the strongest levels of emergent leadership perceptions. 
 The final hypothesis (H5) involving global leadership networks suggested that 
pressures for coalition building would result in a positive tendency to engage in 
generalized exchange relationships. This was tested in Models I and IV using cyclic 
configurations of order 3 (“3-cycles”). The results show that once effects due to 
homophily, reciprocity, and transitivity are taken into account, 3-cycles are extremely 
unlikely. This indicates that to the extent leadership coalitions or subgroups exist, they 
are more likely to involve dyadic effects such as reciprocity and homophily, not 
generalized exchange. 
Transformational and transactional leadership networks 
 Table 4 also presents model parameters related to Hypotheses 6 and 7, involving 
comparisons between transformational and transactional leadership networks. Random 
graph parameters associated with weak transformational and transactional relations are 
                                                 
19
 Note that this does not mean that most leadership nominations are actually reciprocated – it merely 
means that, conditional on other structural effects, there is more reciprocity than we would expect to see 
by chance. 
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shown in Models III and V, respectively, while parameters associated with strong 
relationships are shown in Models IV and VI. To compare structural effects, confidence 
intervals were calculated for each structural effect. Comparing 95% CIs for parameter 
estimates provides an extremely conservative test of the difference between the two. 
 A simulation study by Peyton, Greenstone, and Schenker (2003) found that when 
ratios of parameter standard errors are below 2, 84% CIs will overlap 95% of the time. 
Therefore, 84% CI were estimated for parameter estimates in transformational and 
transactional leadership networks. Overlapping CIs mean that parameter estimates are 
not significantly different from one another (p > .05). In the case of reciprocity (H6), 
confidence intervals consistently overlapped; thus, H6 was not supported. Similarly, in 
the case of strong networks, there was substantial overlap in estimates of transitivity. 
However, in the case of moderately strong networks, estimates of transitivity did not 
overlap (upper and lower estimates of [1.13, 1.25] and [.97, 1.09] for transformational 
and transactional networks, respectively). These results provide partial support for H7, 
which suggested that transformational networks are more likely than transactional ties to 
involve transitive and reciprocal structures. 
 However, the model also indicates that these two types of leadership networks 
differed in ways not predicted: for example, moderately strong transformational 
leadership networks displayed significantly lower levels of in-degree centralization than 
transactional networks. This indicates that the number of transactional leadership 
nominations received by actors in the network were significantly more variable than the 
number of transformational leadership nominations. 
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 These results suggest that hierarchies within the two leadership networks tend to 
take slightly different forms, with actors in the transformational leadership network 
being prominent by their participation in transitive clusters and reciprocal dyads, and 
displaying a tendency to avoid preferential attachment (e.g., forming ties with more 
prominent leaders). By contrast, the transactional network appeared to have a much 
more substantial bias towards in-degree centralization and away from transitivity. This 
indicates that compared to transformational leaders, prominent transactional leaders are 
slightly more likely to be at the center of degree-based structures such as stars, especially 
by being connected to lower-degree (less prominent) leaders. 
Attributes and emergent leadership structures 
 Individual attributes were primarily included as controls for the random graph 
analyses; however, they highlight a number of important relational tendencies in the 
various emergent leadership networks. In Table 4b, these effects are listed under the 
headings homophily effects, attribute ego effects, and attribute alter effects. 
 Homophily effects refer to the tendency for people to form ties with others who 
share similar levels of an attribute. As shown in Table 4b, there were significant levels of 
homophily in each of the leadership networks. As might be expected from previous 
research on proximity, location proved to be a consistent predictor of leadership 
nominations across all networks, such that individuals were much more likely to 
nominate leaders within their own particular business location. However, this effect was 
weaker for more “relaxed” network definitions, suggesting that the weak leadership ties 
are more likely than strong leadership ties to form across different locations. 
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 There were also significant homophily effects related to sex, supervisor status, 
and tenure in several of the weak networks (e.g., Models I, III, and V). Interestingly, 
there was no evidence of homophily in strong leadership networks outside of the effect 
of location. This may indicate that weaker leadership relations are more subject to the 
effects of homophily than strong ties. 
 The rest of the parameters in Table 4b refer to the effect that individual attributes 
have on the number of leadership nominations made (ego effects) and received (alter 
effects). Across all networks (Models I-VI), sex appears to have significant effects on 
the likelihood of being selected as a leader as well as identifying others as a leader. 
Specifically, women were less likely to nominate others as leaders and to be nominated. 
Supervisor status was also a significant factor in several of the networks; supervisors 
were more likely to be the recipient of leadership nominations, especially in “strong” 
leadership networks, and were slightly less likely to ascribe transactional leadership 
status to other supervisors (B = -.19, p < .01) in moderately strong networks. Finally, 
there were several main effects related to tenure, such that individuals who had been 
with the organization longer were more likely to be nominated as leaders. In the weak 
overall leadership networks (e.g., Model I), those who had been with the organization 
longer made fewer leadership nominations. 
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DISCUSSION 
 Results from the study highlight the complex nature of informal leadership and 
influence structures in organizations. Although perceptions of leadership and influence 
are clearly related to individual attributes such as sex and formal status in the 
organization, these networks also display a variety of relational tendencies that go 
beyond individual and dyadic-level effects. Just as importantly, these effects appear to 
differ to some degree by the type of leadership relationship perceived by actors. 
 Overall, the study found that support for the hypotheses tended to depend on the 
strength of the leadership network, with some exceptions. There was strong support for 
Hypothesis 2 (transitivity) and substantial support for Hypothesis 3 (multiple clusters of 
transitive ties), and no support for Hypotheses 1 (degree-based centralization), 5 
(generalized exchange), or 6 (differences in reciprocity across transformational and 
transactional leadership networks). There was partial support for Hypotheses 4 
(reciprocity) and 7 (differences in transitivity between transformational and transactional 
leadership networks). 
Structural interpretations 
 Beyond the specific hypothesis tests, the results highlight the interdependent 
nature of leadership and influence. The parameters in Table 4 reveal a variety of 
complex patterns at multiple levels of analysis. Some of these patterns were expected, 
but a surprising number were not, and the combination of factors provides a great deal of 
information on the nature of leadership and influence within the sample organization. 
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 The overall picture of leadership painted by the model is a structure where 
relationships form on the basis of both individual demographics a few fundamental 
structural features that reflect simultaneous pressures for both centralization and 
decentralization. For example, strong leadership relations appear to be based on shared 
physical location, sex differences in the propensity to send leadership nominations, as 
well as differences in the tendency to receive nominations associated with sex, 
supervisor status, and tenure. 
 Conditional on these effects, there is strong tendency for the formation of 
multiple cores of overlapping transitive triangles (positive k-triangles and negative 
independent k-paths), for little variability in leadership in-degrees outside of these 
transitive cores (n.s. in-star parameter in the presence of k-triangle and k-path 
parameters), and for some followers outside of the transitive cores to nominate multiple 
leaders (positive out-stars in the presence of k-triangle and k-path parameters). That is, 
prominent leaders appear to receive nominations from followers who attract followers 
themselves, not from independent actors; and that this process tends to occur within 
slightly separated leadership clusters. It also suggests that there may be some 
unmeasured factor that prevents high-degree leaders from existing outside of tightly-knit 
clusters of transitive leadership relations, such as department membership or inter-office 
location. Finally, there is a strong tendency not to engage in generalized exchange 
relationships. 
 The weak overall leadership network displays many of these same 
characteristics: there is an even stronger tendency for cliquish behavior based on 
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transitive triangles (positive k-triangles and negative independent k-paths) but not 
generalized exchange. Popular leaders tend to be popular within these transitive cliques 
(indicated by the negative in-star parameter in the presence of a positive transitivity 
effect), not outside of them; this result may reflect the existence of favored in-groups and 
the differential development of relationships between leaders and various followers, 
which is predicted by theories such as LMX (Sparrowe & Liden, 1997), and there is 
substantial variability in the number of leadership nominations made by individuals 
outside of these cliques (positive out-star parameter). 
 Interestingly, there is a strong tendency to reciprocate ties in the weak leadership 
network which is not present in the strong network, suggesting that stronger leadership 
and influence networks tend to be slightly more hierarchical. There is also a weaker 
effect of location homophily in the weak overall leadership network, and weaker ties 
may be more likely to form outside of specific geographical locations, consistent with 
the Granovetter’s concept of the strength of weak ties (Granovetter, 1973) that form 
bridges between cohesive cliques. 
 Transformational leadership ties tended to follow very similar patterns to global 
leadership ties, but transactional networks appeared to be substantially more hierarchical 
in the traditional sense: compared to the other networks, the in-star parameters were 
more positive, especially in the strong transactional network. This suggests a significant 
level of degree-based centralization occurring outside of the more cliquish transitive 
structures, and a core-periphery structure at least partly based on star-like structures 
instead of overlapping triangles, in the case of transactional leadership. 
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Findings and implications 
 One of the more interesting findings was that structural predictors of the 
emergent leadership network were at least as powerful as explanations based on 
individual demographics and formal power (which have been the most-studied factors in 
traditional emergent leadership research), and these structural effects were highly 
significant even after taking the individual-level effects into account. For example, in a 
geographically dispersed network, we might expect to see multiple core-periphery 
structures and significant levels of clustering, but the analysis shows that pressures for 
transitive clusters are even stronger than (and cannot be explained by) the effects of 
shared location on leadership tie formation. Similarly, there is also a very strong 
tendency for reciprocity in weak leadership networks which cannot be explained by sex, 
tenure, supervisory position, or location. 
 The implication for research on shared leadership is that weak leadership is 
shared reciprocally between members of the organization, while strong leadership is not 
shared. This means that it is not so much a question of whether leadership is shared in 
groups, but what aspects of leadership are shared, where that sharing occurs, and how 
the sharing affects the group and its members. For example, weak levels of global 
leadership are apparently shared more easily across geographical boundaries and 
between different clusters of leaders, but less easily shared between members of 
different sexes (as denoted by a stronger level of homophily associated with sex). This 
might imply that strong leadership ties are more aligned with the formal hierarchy, or 
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that weak ties serve a different purpose than strong ties, and are subject to different 
social pressures or result from different schemas. 
 Whether the existence of emergent leadership ties that cut across cliques and 
geography is a good thing for organizations is a different question. In some cases – such 
as when informal leaders support counterproductive behaviors in the organization, or 
goals that are not aligned with the rest of the organization – the existence of informally 
shared leadership ties could have serious negative consequences for the organization. In 
other cases, informal leadership networks could provide social support and informational 
influence that the formal structure fails to provide, in which case the organization would 
benefit by having a broad, dense network of informal leaders. Thus, whether such 
networks are (on balance) a good thing or bad thing depends on the people who fill those 
roles, and their specific position within the larger network. Answering this question will 
require researchers to identify ways in which individual characteristics and network roles 
interact with one another. 
 Another, surprising finding was the relative level of symmetry and 
decentralization present in the leadership structure. The strong level of reciprocity 
present in the weak networks is in direct contrast to the traditional view of leadership as 
a primarily hierarchical phenomenon (Pearce & Conger, 2003), and there was no 
evidence for negative levels of reciprocity, even in networks based on a strong definition 
of leadership. The high level of reciprocity found in the strong transactional leadership 
network represents an especially surprising result: this network explicitly refers to 
relationships which are often considered to be very asymmetric: monitoring and 
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rewarding work performance. However, it appears that weak transactional leadership 
relations involve a significant level of reciprocal transaction, where transactions are not 
strictly one-directional (e.g., rewards for performance), but often bi-directional, where 
both parties play the role of transactional leader to each other, monitoring and rewarding 
one another. 
 To the extent that the networks were centralized, it was a relatively “soft” 
centralization, with several connected core-periphery structures based on transitive 
triangles as opposed to highly centralized trees and stars. This suggests the key role of 
triads - rather than clusters of larger size - in the study of leadership. The only exception 
to this pattern was in the strongly defined transactional leadership network. One possible 
interpretation of this result is that transactional relations are more dependent than other 
networks on the reward powers and legitimacy conferred by the formal organizational 
hierarchy, which follows a tree-like arrangement. 
 These results have a number of implications for theory and practice. At a general 
level, the results highlight some of the utility of studying leadership networks instead of 
individual leaders or the qualities of individual leader-follower dyads (Mehra, et al., 
2006). Leaders do not exist in a vacuum, and the results of the current analysis provide 
clear evidence that leadership ties involve dyadic- and triadic-level effects, in addition to 
individual-level effects. The analysis also demonstrates how complicated social patterns 
of the sort pictured in Figure 16 can be explained by a smaller number of underlying 
structural features. By focusing only on individuals and independent dyadic relations, 
researchers studying leadership run the risk of missing important effects. 
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 Specifically, future research may need to refocus on higher-order (e.g., triadic) 
levels of analysis. Leadership networks in the current study displayed a variety of 
complex patterns at multiple levels of analysis, many of which would not be predicted 
from individual or dyadic-oriented theories of leadership. For example, some of the 
strongest effects (e.g., transitivity, independent k-paths, and k-stars) were triadic effects, 
raising the possibility that leadership may not be a primarily an individual or dyadic 
phenomenon. Rather than focusing only on the development of leadership relations by 
individuals and dyads, future research may need to better account for third-party effects 
on emergent leadership and influence. 
 Another implication of the current study is that emergent leadership networks 
appear to be surprisingly decentralized, compared to what might be expected based on 
the outcomes of traditional leaderless group designs and other leader-centered research. 
Instead of a handful of individuals receiving the bulk of leadership nominations in a few 
star-like structures, nominations tended to occur in a handful of loosely organized 
transitive clusters, surrounded by followers who often perceived multiple leaders across 
different transitive structures. Instead of a system of leadership defined by a few key 
players who wield control over a linear hierarchy, the results suggest that emergent 
leadership is much more widely and evenly distributed across the organization, with 
tendencies for loose clusters of partially ordered, entangled heterarchies (Kontopoulos, 
1993) and reciprocal dyads instead of fully-ordered tree-like structures associated with 
formal organizational hierarchies. In fact, the various emergent leadership structures 
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correlate highly with friendship, which is not a relationship known for being highly 
centralized in organizations. 
 This kind of decentralized structure implies that organizations which wish to 
achieve goals by leveraging the informal leadership structure may need to move beyond 
the formal organizational chart (Cross & Parker, 2004; Sparrowe & Liden, 1997). 
Instead of relying only on the leadership and influence of formal leaders and managers, 
organizations may need to make an extra effort to develop informal leaders who can 
bridge disparate leadership cliques and reach peripheral actors, or identify structural 
limitations in the formal structure which limit the reach or robustness of the leadership 
system.  
 For example, in the current study, females were significantly less likely to 
receive and send various types of leadership nominations. Sex barriers to being 
perceived as a leader are well-known (Eagly & Karau, 1991), but sex barriers to 
perceiving leadership in others presents a different problem, suggesting that women 
simply do not participate as much in the emergent leadership system as either leaders or 
followers. Moreover, the tendency to engage in reciprocal relations offers a potential 
explanation for these effects: if current leaders were to make an effort to recognize and 
accept the influence of females in the organization, the principle of reciprocity suggests 
that these leaders would gain additional influence by “growing” new leadership ties to 
female actors and incorporating them into the larger leadership structure. 
 A further implication of the results is that leadership and influence networks 
based on the same type of relations but different strengths may be subject to different 
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social processes. In fact, Table 4b suggests that tie strength was a more important 
determinant of structural characteristics than the type of leadership tie (transformational 
versus transactional). For strong ties, homophily due to location proved to be a stronger 
effect, but homophily associated with other individual differences and reciprocity was 
weaker or non-existent. For moderately strong ties, there were more effects associated 
with individual differences, weaker effects of shared location, and strong levels of 
reciprocity. One possibility is that the factors which influence the formation of ties are 
different for “strong” ties than for “weaker” ties. Another possibility is that stronger and 
weaker ties interact: for example, there may be social pressure for those who receive 
strong leadership or influence relations to reciprocate by sending “weak” nominations to 
their followers in a type of strong-weak exchange relation. 
 Finally, the results show that the various types of leadership relations displayed 
very similar overall patterns to one another, as well as to the global (non-specific) 
leadership networks. One possible implication of this is that individual perceptions of 
what constitute leadership tend to subsume basic aspects of both transformational and 
transactional leadership. While some individuals may be more prone to a “charismatic” 
view of leadership, and others may be more prone to a “managerial” view, the similarity 
in overall patterns certainly suggests the possibility that global leadership nominations 
may be the result of both transformational and transactional factors. The two types of 
leadership could also be subject to social pressures from similar sources, like 
organizational norms for reciprocity and sex effects, similar limitations in the 
opportunity for social interactions, or shared antecedent social ties, like trust. 
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Limitations 
 The results of the study, while potentially interesting, are subject to a number of 
limitations that affect their validity and interpretability. One of the primary limitations is 
that the study was only a snapshot of a single organization. This means (a) that 
generalizations to other organizations must necessarily be suspect, and (b) that the study 
cannot separate selection from influence effects, or in some cases, make definitive 
statements about the nature of the various structural characteristics. Thus, interpretations 
of the analyses must be limited in scope. 
 The generalizability issue is common to network studies (and to most 
organizational studies), which often involve the analysis of only a single network. While 
we cannot use such studies to make definitive statements about general tendencies across 
all organizations, we can use the results to point to the possibility of such tendencies. For 
example, while researchers would surely expect levels of reciprocity to vary across 
different groups, the fact that leadership nominations showed some significant signs of 
relational symmetry provides an important data point. It demonstrates that symmetric 
leadership relations are not only possible, but even probable in certain types of groups, 
and that centralized hierarchy is not necessarily a defining feature of leadership 
structures in organizations. While these results cannot tell use how most organizations 
are organized, they do tell us that organizations can be organized in surprising ways. 
  The second issue, time, is a more limiting factor in the interpretation of the 
current results. While these results clearly show that certain types of relational patterns 
in this organization are unlikely to be observed by random chance, it is not precisely 
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clear how such patterns tended to form. For example, reciprocity could develop 
synchronously or asynchronously: individuals could make or accept influence attempts 
at a certain time, and this tie might only be reciprocated after a long period of time; or 
they could look to one another for leadership simultaneously, because of common 
external pressures like a lack of formal leadership or an uncertain environment. The 
results show that the leadership network formed a loosely organized core-periphery 
structure, but is that structure stable or unstable? Do these transitive relations form on 
the basis of anticipated (future) balance at a given point in time, or on the basis of past 
competition between actors? All the current study can do is point out possible 
interpretations of the observed patterns, but these patterns may form differently over 
time, depending on the nature of the specific social processes that cause them to occur. 
 Another issue is the measurement of transformational and transactional 
leadership. There are a wide variety of scales designed to measure different facets of 
these constructs. However, due to the practical issues of data collection for a moderately 
large network, even the shortest traditional forms are unfeasible20. The sociometric items 
used in the study come directly from the definitions of each type of leadership, but must 
necessarily exclude facets and gradations in leadership ratings which longer or more 
formal scales would be able to capture. This raises the possibility that network studies 
designed to capture those extra facets or gradations of leadership would find different 
patterns from the current study. On that basis, it is necessary to keep in mind the specific 
                                                 
20
 For a network with g members, every actor must answer g-1 items for every sociometric item in the 
survey. In the current study, with 143 participants, each person must therefore respond to 142 items for 
each network question being measured. 
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aspects of transformational and transactional leadership being measured when 
interpreting the results. 
 A third issue is that not every potentially important variable was controlled for in 
the current set of models. For example, one important source of leadership nominations 
may be the strength of affective regard, in which case more popular individuals (e.g., 
those who are more central in the friendship network) may be more likely to be 
nominated as sources of leadership and influence. Another important source of power is 
location in the formal organizational hierarchy, and formal supervisor-employee 
relationships. The current analysis only controlled for supervisory power in a general 
fashion, and did not take into account the specific effects of formal organizational dyadic 
ties. The inclusion of these effects in future analyses could help identify the source of 
different relational patterns in the leadership network by more explicitly distinguishing 
between the effects of formal authority and informal popularity on leadership 
perceptions. This would help identify to what degree formal managerial power accounts 
for status and influence within the informally-specified leadership network. 
 Another important limitation has to do with the way that influence was 
conceptualized and measured in the study. For example, it is possible that participants 
conceive of influence as both a direct and indirect relationship: they might acknowledge 
little direct influence on the part of a given actor (for example, when there is no actual 
social interaction), but acknowledge and report influence they receive indirectly (for 
example, through reputation). The distinction between these two types of influence 
(direct vs. indirect) represents an important issue, since it might be expected that they 
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represent different aspects of influence, and arise through different processes. This may 
explain one source of the differences in weak/strong structures: strong ties may be 
capturing more direct influence than weak ties. However, without additional research, it 
is not possible to distinguish between the two. 
 The limitations point to the need for future research, and possible directions. One 
of the most basic extensions would be to conduct a multilevel analysis by examining 
multiple groups from different organizations. This could allow for the explicit 
assessment of network-level variability in basic structural patterns like homophily and 
reciprocity, and the organizational characteristics that relate to this variability (for 
example, industry type, organization size, geographical location, etc.). Another basic 
extension would be to capture network data at multiple time points. This would allow for 
the disentangling of selection and influence effects, and give a truly dynamic picture of 
the social processes occurring within the network. 
Future directions 
 There are additional aspects of social structure which could be studied in future 
research. For example, instead of focusing on patterns related to low-level cohesiveness 
(dyads, triads, etc.), research could instead focus on identifying much more broad 
patterns, such as role structures. The complex patterns observed in the current study 
suggest that simply classifying people into “leader” and “followers” may be too 
simplistic; future research could try to identify the various role sets (Katz & Kahn, 1978) 
which might exist within the leadership structure, and how individuals in those role sets 
relate to one another. Instead of predicting who will be the follower and who will be the 
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leader, such an analysis could allow researchers to predict who will be the most 
influential person within a particular social role, or who will be the most likely to 
provide simultaneous influence to members of multiple role sets. 
 Another important avenue for future research is to link leadership and influence 
relations to other social networks in organizations, especially those for which extensive 
research currently exists. Relationships like trust, acquaintanceship, advice-seeking, 
friendship, and communication commonly appear in network studies of organizations; 
by including these sorts of ties in network studies of leadership, researchers could study 
leadership from a multiplex perspective. This would allow for the identification of 
relational dependencies associated with leadership and influence, in which ties like trust 
or respect might be “exchanged” for influence, where power brokers transform informal 
access to leaders into influence for themselves, or where different classes of leadership 
ties exist, each associated with a different combination of relationships and social 
characteristics. 
 Finally, future research must focus on the organizational outcomes associated 
with emergent leadership networks. Much has been written about the effects of 
decentralized formal structure and network forms of governance (Jones, Hesterly, & 
Borgatti, 1997), but little is known about the effects of informal leadership structures. 
Do teams with greater leadership density or reciprocity perform better than those with 
fewer relations? Does the type of centralization matter? Do the effects of leadership 
dispersion on performance differ depending on the level of analysis (workgroup, 
department, or organization)? How much actual influence do emergent leaders have with 
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followers’ attitudes and behaviors? How much does the performance of an informal 
leader affect organizational performance, compared to the performance of a leader who 
occupies a formal position? 
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CONCLUSION 
 By conceptualizing leadership as a network, it is possible to identify complex 
structural patterns involving multiple levels simultaneously. These patterns provide 
information that can be used to help identify basic social processes associated with their 
creation or maintenance, and a path towards reconciling two different perspectives on 
organizational influence - psychological and structural. The results of the analysis 
highlight a surprising level of reciprocity and decentralization, substantial similarities 
across two different types of leadership networks, and differences in the patterning of 
strong and weak leadership relations. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
SELECTED GLOSSARY OF BASIC NETWORK TERMS 
 
Actor:    Individual node in a network. Could represent an individual, group, or  
   entire organization, depending on the level of analysis. 
 
Centrality:  Generally speaking, a node-level measure of importance or power in the  
   network. Can be as simple as popularity (number of incoming ties each  
   node receives) or as complex as eigenvector centrality (in which each  
   actor’s centrality is weighted by the centrality of their connections). The  
   precise interpretation of the meaning of a particular measure of centrality  
   will depend on what the tie represents as well as the type of centrality  
   being measured. 
 
Centralization:  Most commonly, refers to the extent to which a given network is  
   centralized, usually operationalized in terms of the variance in centrality  
   scores of individual actors, such that highly centralized graphs (such as a  
   star network) will have large centralization indeces. 
 
Clique:   Different operationalizations of cliques exist, but the term generally refers  
   to a particular set of actors that are tightly connected to one another, but  
   not necessarily connected to those outside the clique. 
 
Density:   The extent to which the number of ties that could exist in the network are  
   actually observed. 
 
Dyad:   A pair (2) of nodes. Examples of common dyads would be husband and  
   wife, student and teacher, or supervisor and employee. 
 
Graph/network:  The set of actors and relationships between them. 
 
Tie:   The relationship that links nodes in the network. In social networks, this is  
   usually some type of formal or informal social relationship, but the  
   concept can be extended to include ties defined on the basis of things like  
   common memberships, for example. 
 
Triad:   A set of nodes taken three (3) at a time. The smallest unit that allows for  
   the representation of third-party effects and certain types of clustering. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
FACTOR ANALYSIS OF LEADERSHIP RELATIONS 
 
To better explore the relationship between the various emergent ties, several CFA models were tested 
using the correlations within each class of relationships (strong and weak). Table A1 below describes the 
different models tested. All models appeared to fit the data well, but AIC suggested that Model 3 provided 
the best fit for both strong and weak relationships. Model fit criteria are shown in Table A2, and parameter 
estimates are shown in Table A3 and A4. 
 
All models appeared to fit the data well; RMR and RMSEA criteria suggested Model 3 fit the best in both 
strong and weak relations. AIC suggested the best-fitting model was Model 1, but that this fit was not 
incrementally better ( > 2) than the next best-fitting model, Model 3. These results support a model with 
three highly correlated leadership factors, and a single friendship factor. 
 
 
Table B1: CFA models 
 
Model  Description         
1  Single relationship factor, encompassing both friendship and leadership. 
2  One leadership factor, plus a correlated single-indicator friendship factor. 
3  Four correlated factors for each type of leadership and friendship. 
4  Four lower-order factors, plus a single higher-order factor. 
 
 
Table B2: Model fits 
 
Weak relationships 
Model   RMR RSMEA AIC NNFI  NFI R1  D2  
1  .03 .07  -4.6 .98 .97 .96 .99 
2  .03 .08  -2.6 .98 .97 .95 .99 
3  .02 .06  -3.4 .98 .98 .96 .99 
4  .02 .08  -0.5 .97 .98 .95 .99 
 
Strong relationships 
Model   RMR RSMEA AIC NNFI  NFI R1  D2  
1  .03 .07  -5.1 .98 .97 .95 .99 
2  .03 .07  -3.1 .98 .97 .95 .99 
3  .02 .05  -5.1 .99 .98 .96 .99 
4  .02 .07  -2.3 .98 .98 .95 .99 
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Table B3: Standardized factor loadings and factor correlations for Model 3 (weak) 
 
            Factors 
   Overall  Transformational Transactional  Friendship 
Friendship         1.0 (fixed) 
Leadership  .89 
Influence  .86 
Role-modeling    .89 
Goal-setting    .87 
Monitoring       .82 
Rewarding       .86 
 
Factor correlations          
Overall    
Transformational .99 
Transactional  .91  .91 
Friendship  .67  .63   .60 
 
 
 
Table B4: Standardized factor loadings and factor correlations for Model 3 (strong) 
 
            Factors 
   Overall  Transformational Transactional  Friendship 
Friendship         1.0 (fixed) 
Leadership  .89 
Influence  .82 
Role-modeling    .88 
Goal-setting    .86 
Monitoring       .81 
Rewarding       .87 
 
Factor correlations          
Overall    
Transformational .98 
Transactional  .89  .90 
Friendship  .51  .49   .49 
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APPENDIX C 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE SAMPLE 
 
SOCIAL NETWORK QUESTIONNAIRE 
In every organization, basic social dynamics lead to complex patterns of interpersonal relationships. By 
identifying these patterns (sometimes referred to as “social networks”), researchers can tell a lot about 
the social dynamics of organizations. 
 
On the next several pages, you will be asked about your perceptions of several common social ties you 
might have with other people in your organization, described below: 
 
1. Influence – To what extent do other people in the organization influence your opinions, attitudes, or 
behaviors? 
2. Leadership – To what extent do other people provide you with what you consider to be leadership? 
3. Goal-setting – To what extent do particular people help you set what you consider to be more difficult or 
higher goals for yourself? 
4. Role-modeling – To what extent do particular people act as a role model to you in some way? 
5. Rewards – To what extent do other individuals recognize or reward your performance? Please note that this 
includes informal rewards such as congratulations, praise, or encouragement. 
6. Monitoring – To what extent do other individuals monitor your performance or notice how you do your job? 
This includes informal monitoring, for example, a co-worker noticing that you have been doing your job using 
a different method or technique than usual. 
7. Friendship – To what extent would you describe other individuals in the organization to be a friend? 
 
You don’t need to describe your relationship with every person in the organization – just people 
you’re familiar with. For people you are familiar with, please respond to items 1 to 7 using the scale 
provided (1 = Not at all, 2 = Somewhat, 3 = Extensively). 
 
If you aren't clear about the meaning of a term or item, please refer back to this page for the description, 
or use your best judgment. 
 
EXAMPLE 
 
Say you are describing your relationship with a person named “Jo.” If you think Jo tends to influence you a 
lot, you might circle a “3” for item (1) before completing the other items, as shown below. If you aren’t 
familiar with Jo, you might skip the items for her entirely, and move on to the next person on the list you 
are familiar with. 
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Instructions: For each item (1-7), circle the response that best describes your relationship with people in the 
organization you’re familiar with. You DON’T need to answer items for every person on the list – for example, if 
you’re only familiar with 10 people in the organization, then you would only respond to items for those 10 people. 
You don’t need to answer questions about yourself. Use the following scale: 
 
1 = Not at all, 2 = Somewhat, 3 = Extensively 
 
 
Names 
(by location) 
(1)   
 
INFLUENCES 
you 
(2) 
 
Provides you 
with 
LEADERSHIP 
(3) 
 
Influences you 
to SET 
HIGHER 
GOALS 
(4) 
 
Provides a 
ROLE MODEL 
for you 
(5)  
 
REWARDS 
(formally or 
informally) your 
performance 
(6) 
 
  MONITORS 
your 
performance 
(7) 
 
Is a 
FRIEND 
LOCATION 1 
            
 
NAME 1 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 
NAME 2 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 
NAME 3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 
NAME 4 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 
NAME 5 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 
NAME 6 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 
NAME 7 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 
NAME 8 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 1    2    3 
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